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Abstract 
This article focuses on the calculation of performance level (PL) by standard ISO 13849-1 Safety of machinery – Safety-
related parts of control systems – Part 1: General principles for design [1]. Requirements of current standards are discussed and 
a typical composition of emergency stop is presented. Safety parameters of components and their determination and calculation 
are shown. The steps to determine the performance level for safety function of emergency stop along with a proposal to improve 
the reliability of existing systems are outlined. 
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1. Introduction 
When designing any machinery, designers have to take into account a large number of different criteria. One of 
them is safety of machinery and compliance with the requirements for performance level (PLr) of each safety 
function. It is necessary to comply with PLr not only with newly designed systems but also with the existing ones. 
[5] This article deals with calculation and estimate of the performance level PL for safety function of emergency 
stop according the standard ISO 13849-1 Safety of machinery – Safety-related parts of control systems – Part 1: 
General principles for design [1]. A designed safety function must comply with PLr determined according to the 
standard ISO 12100 Safety of machinery – General principles for design – Risk assessment and risk reduction [2]. 
According to the standard IEC 61508 [3] we can use another approach to assess the safety function by setting SIL 
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(Safety Integrity Level). [6] An important problem is the case of non-compliance of PLr according to the standard. 
This article discusses the possibility of increasing the reliability of the system that can be used in design stage of 
machinery. 
 
Nomenclature 
B10D Number of operating cycles after which 10 percent of population of components will have failed 
dangerously 
dop Mean operating time in days per year 
DC Diagnostic Coverage 
DCavg Average Diagnostic Coverage 
hop Mean operating time in hours per day 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
MTTFD Mean Time to Dangerous Failure 
nop Number of operating cycles per year 
PFHD Probability of Dangerous Failure per Hour 
PL Performance Level  
tcycle Mean time between two consecutive cycles 
2. Description of safety function 
The system which performs the safety function consists of input, logic and output parts. The input parts detect the 
external signals and forward them to logic parts of the system where they are evaluated. The output parts provide 
a required intervention; in this case it is an emergency stop of every dangerous machinery movement, the so-called 
stop-category 1, i.e. all movements are stopped and the power supply of the machine is disconnected. An example of 
structure and connection of the components can be seen the following scheme in Fig. 1: 
x Input parts: Emergency Stop Pushbutton 
x Logic parts: Safety Logic Module 
Control Unit 
x Output parts: Motor Modules 
Contactors 
 
 
Fig. 1. Scheme of safety function. 
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The whole system operates as follows. As soon as the machine operator pushes the emergency stop button, the 
signal goes to the safety logic module which evaluates the signal. It can proceed from the safety logic module via 
fieldbus to a control unit which controls output parts of a low voltage converter – these can be single motor modules 
or double motor modules (single motor modules used to drive a spindle, double motor modules used to drive 
motions in the respective axes, e.g. X/C or Y/Z). The signal can also proceed from the safety logic module to 
contactors, which can disconnect e.g. a chip conveyer, a bar feeder, and a pump for cooling the tools. It is suitable to 
place one contactor in front of each asynchronous motor (contactors 3, 4 and 5) and two contactors at the beginning 
of wiring. This connection guarantees a disconnection of all three motors even if one of contactors 3, 4 or 5 failed. 
This approach meets the condition necessary to achieve higher performance levels (PLd, PLe), i.e. safety functions 
must operate via two independent channels. 
3. Determination of performance level of safety function 
Step 1 – Hazard identification and risk assessment (comply with ISO 12100 Safety of machinery – General 
principles for design – Risk assessment and risk reduction [2]) 
The standard ISO 12100 [2] defines the terminology and methodology used to achieve safety of machinery. [7] In 
the first step of performance level determining, it is important to identify dangers that may occur in case of safety 
function failure; in this case the safety function of emergency stop in stop-category 1. The dangers resulting from 
failure are abrasions, fractures, amputation of extremities or scalping. In successive steps, it is necessary to 
determine the severity of injury (S), frequency and/or duration of exposure (F) and possible prevention of 
danger (P).  
There are serious injuries (S2). Although the operator is protected by protective coverage, when setting up the 
machine, changing the tools or changing the workpiece, the operator is exposed to danger (F2). Furthermore the 
operator is threatened by a chip conveyor, bar feeder and other moving parts. Prevention of danger is possible (P1). 
From this determine parameters results requirement performance level PLr d (by the graph in Fig. 2). However, 
there are may be differences between risk estimations from different analysis groups. [8] 
 
      
Fig. 2. Graph for determine PLr [1]. 
Step 2: Determination of architecture of safety function 
Determining the suitable architecture is a very important step in designing a safety function because the method 
of connection affects the category by ISO 13849-1 [1]. Therefore it also means that the category affects the resultant 
performance level. To meet higher levels of PL we need to use architectures for category 3 or 4, i.e. a two-channel 
control (both channels are shown in Fig. 4). 
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Fig. 3. Architecture of safety function. 
As it is evident from Fig. 3 and 4, the condition to comply with PLd is accomplished and the safety function is 
controlled by a two-channel path. This means that the signal from the emergency stop pushbutton passes by a two-
channel path through the safety logic module to the control unit and contactors. Disconnecting of the other 
peripheries (chip conveyer, bar feeder, tools cooling) is solved redundantly. The first method of how to disconnect 
peripheries is via contactors 1 and 2 (contactors 1 and 2 are placed at the beginning of wiring). The second method 
is via contactors 3, 4 and 5 (each contactor is placed in front of each asynchronous motor). This connection responds 
to categories 3 and 4 by ISO 13849-1 [1]. Categories 3 and 4 have the same architecture but their values of MTTFD 
and DC are different. In category 4 MTTFD has to be high (≥30 years) and DC has to be high (≥99%). 
Step 3: Determination of parameters of each components of safety function  
For a correct and complete calculation of performance level, it is necessary to know safety parameters of each 
component used in safety function. These parameters can be found on manufacturer website or in products 
catalogue. The parameters we are interested in are mainly the mean time to dangerous failure (MTTFD), the 
probability of dangerous failure per hour (PFHD), the number of operating cycles after which 10 percent of 
population of components will have failed dangerously (B10D) and diagnostic coverage DC. 
Step 4: Calculation of mean time to dangerous failure (MTTFD) for each channel and diagnostic coverage (DC) 
If we know MTTFD of each component, we can calculate MTTFD for the first and second channel. If we do not 
know this parameter, we can always use formulas 1 or 3 to calculate MTTFD of components. Formula no. 1 will be 
used if we know B10D value and the number of operating cycles per year nop. nop is calculated using formula no. 2 
(there we need to determine the mean operating time in days per year dop, the mean operating time in hours per day 
hop and the time between two consecutive cycles tcycle). Formula no. 3 is used when we know PFHD of each 
component. Another method of how to calculate MTTFD is in annex C in ISO 13849-1 [1]. The channels of safety 
function are illustrated in Fig. 4. The activation channel 1 has the same result – namely emergency stop in stop-
category 1. 
 
Fig. 4. Two channels of safety function. 
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where:  nop is number of operating cycles per year 
dop is mean operating time in days per year 
 hop is mean operating time in hours per day 
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D
D PFH
MTTF u 8760
1
                         (3) 
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where:  MTTFD1…n is mean time to dangerous failure for each component 
 
If we have identified all MTTFD’s of all components in the safety function, we need to calculate MTTFD for each 
channel and then for the whole safety function. From this result we will see if MTTFD is low, medium or high. 
 
Calculation MTTFD for channel 1: 
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Calculation MTTFD for channel 2: 
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Calculation overall MTTFD for safety function: 
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To determine the performance level, it is necessary to determine the overall diagnostic coverage DC. The 
diagnostic coverage is the ratio of the probability of detected dangerous failures to the probability all dangerous 
failures. The diagnostic coverage is calculated by the formula no. 8. 
 
DnDDD
Dn
n
DDD
avg
MTTFMTTFMTTFMTTF
MTTF
DC
MTTF
DC
MTTF
DC
MTTF
DC
DC
1.....111
.....
321
3
3
2
2
1
1


 
              (8) 
where: DCn is diagnostic coverage of each components 
 MTTFDn is mean time to dangerous failure for each component 
 
                                                Table 1. Table for determine of diagnostic coverage [1] 
DIAGNOSTIC COVERAGE 
SIGNIFICATION RANGE 
0 DC < 60% 
LOW 60% ≤ DC < 90% 
MEDIUM 90% ≤ DC < 99% 
HIGH 99% ≤ DC 
 
Step 5: Estimate for common cause failures (CCF) 
The last step before PL verification is to determine the precaution against failures having a common cause. It is 
suitable to use the standard ISO 13849-1[1] for this purpose, specifically its appendix F and tables F1 and F2, where 
it is possible to determine the overall point value of precaution against CCF. These precautions depend mainly on 
the system protection against various environmental impacts, overvoltage, overcurrent, way of communication, etc. 
A maximum of point count is 100; however it is necessary to exceed the limit of 65 pts. 
Step 6: Verification of performance level (PL) 
From the calculated values (MTTFD and DCavg) and from the category we can find out if it meets the requirement 
for performance level PLr. To perform this, we can use the following table for verification of PL. 
 
    Table 2. Table for verification of PL [1] 
Category B 1 2 2 3 3 4 
        
DCavg 0 0 low medium low medium high 
MTTFD 
low a uncovered a b b c uncovered 
medium b uncovered b c c d uncovered 
high uncovered c c d d d e 
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4. Proposal for procedure of how to increase the reliability of the designed system 
If the situation occurs where the performance level is calculated using the above mentioned procedure and it is 
found out that it does not comply with legislative requirements, it is necessary to modify the system. In the phase of 
design, there is a high probability that this situation occurs because our intention is to design the system as simple as 
possible, as cheap as possible and with low number of elements. There are two possibilities of how to improve the 
reliability and trouble free function. It is possible to increase the reliability of the existing system without adding 
other elements. Another method is to improve the reliability by adding other elements (system backup), see Fig.7.  
The first rule of reliability (the lesser the number of elements the lesser is the probability of their failure) was 
used during the initial draft. Another possibility is to use the elements with increased reliability but it means a higher 
price. To avoid the use of more expensive components, we can modify working conditions of elements, i.e. 
eliminate the sources of vibrations, humidity, dust and temperature. This also often extends the lifetime of elements. 
 However to reach a higher performance level (PL d and e), it is suitable to use a two-channel control of safety 
function as it is shown in the example presented in this article (level d can also be reached through the connection in 
category 2 but it is necessary to use the testing device which controls the function of the system in periodic intervals, 
and simultaneously it must be ensured that this testing device is not a source of potentially dangerous situation). It 
can be achieved using the system backup, i.e. increase in reliability using the redundancy. There are two methods of 
how to create the system backup. The first method is to backup per systems, i.e. to create the second system which is 
the same as the first. In case of failure of the first system, the second system executes its function. The second 
method of system backup is to backup per elements. This kind of backup is more advantageous (also in case of the 
use with the same number of elements) because in case of system failure it is not necessary to substitute the whole 
system but only one element. Other possibilities are the use of fixed or substitution backup. The difference is in the 
character of backup elements. In case of fixed backup, the backup component has the same character; both of them 
have the same connection. In case of substitution backup, the backup element starts its operation only in case of 
failure of the first element to restore its safety function. A disadvantage in the second case is urgency of element 
failure detection, so another detection element is connected to the system. Today it is possible to buy a plenty of 
logical elements, which allows the control of function of other elements. It is possible to connect feedback contacts 
of contactors to the logic module, which can control its potential failures. To reach the performance level d, 
a flowchart in Fig.6 could be an inspiration. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Graphs of combination of MTTFD, DC and category achieve PLd. 
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Fig. 6. Flowchart achieve PLd. 
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Fig. 7. Possibility of increasing the reliability of the designed safety function. 
5. Conclusion 
To reach contemporary legislative requirements, the designed machinery must be safe, i.e. it must also fulfill the 
requirements related to its safety. These requirements are governed by different standards for machinery. For 
example the standards for lathes are above all the following: ISO 23125 Machine tools – Safety – Turning machines 
[4], ISO 12100:2010 Safety of machinery – General principles for design – Risk assessment and risk reduction [2], 
ISO 13849-1:2006 Safety of machinery – Safety-related parts of control systems – Part 1: General principles for 
design [1]. The first standard establishes detailed safety requirements for lathes; the second defines a basic 
terminology and methods used for risk assessment of machinery and for achievement of safety. The last standard is 
a manual on how to assess the overall safety of safety function. It is also the main source for this article because the 
calculation and establishment of emergency stop performance level are based on it. This performance level 
determines the ability of designed system to fulfill the requested safety function. With sequence of steps described in 
this article, it is possible step-by-step to meet the established safety requirements. . This gives us the information if it 
is necessary to modify the system because of safety requirements. 
This article shows different approaches to improvement of reliability and also performance level of safety 
functions. The major purpose of our research is to propose how to proceed in case of non-compliance with requested 
PLr level, which is necessary for reaching the highest levels of PL. This can be ensured via different kinds of 
backup. The result of our research was effort of a simplified form of decision about steps which leads to satisfy the 
PLd. This simplified form is a flowchart which can be useful during the design process of safety function. 
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